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India and Bangladesh need a new Ganga water-sharing treaty

Reciprocity must be the organising principle of the agreement that succeeds the 1996 Farakka Treaty. It should also address climate resilience

Published on: Nov 18, 2026, 06:05:31 IST
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The 1996 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka between India and Bangladesh is set to expire on December 12, 2026 — unless, as per the text of treaty, it is renewed “on the basis of mutual consent”. This presents an opportunity to look beyond the old volumetric allocation of water toward a more informed, adaptive, and sustainable framework for managing their shared river system. For India, as an upper riparian, it also means safeguarding its legitimate water needs.

India’s upstream position brings responsibilities, but transparency cannot be a one-sided obligation. (Shutterstock)
India’s upstream position brings responsibilities, but transparency cannot be a one-sided obligation. (Shutterstock)

The foundations for water cooperation were established soon after Bangladesh gained independence in 1971. In February 1972, Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met in Calcutta, and the following month the two leaders renewed their engagement in Dacca and signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Article VI called upon the two countries to “… make joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood control, river basin development and the development of hydro-electric power and irrigation”. Later that year, the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was constituted. The transboundary rivers were thus approached from the very beginning as shared development. That cooperative spirit, however, would soon be tested by the construction of the Farakka barrage across the Ganga.

Indian engineers largely viewed the Farakka as a purposeful hydraulic structure designed to divert Ganga waters through a feeder canal of 38.38 km into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river system. The additional flow was expected to flush out accumulated silt and sediment deposits from the riverbed, helping maintain navigability of the Hooghly river and keep the Calcutta port operational without continuous and costly mechanical dredging. It was not uncommon at the time to see a hundred or so sunken ships lying in the Hooghly near the port, a grim reminder of the navigational hazards due to silting.

For Bangladesh, the lower riparian, the stakes were even higher. According to its estimates, the diversion of water at Farakka during the dry season threatened serious economic and ecological consequences. Not surprisingly, water-sharing acquired a political and emotive significance, prompting Bangladesh to internationalise the issue.

Following Mujibur Rahman’s assassination on August 15, 1975, and a military takeover, Bangladesh demanded that India halt water withdrawals at Farakka. YB Chavan, the foreign minister, made India’s position explicit: “Investment of 1,500 million rupees is made not to abandon the project.” However, as a “measure of friendship”, India announced a unilateral decision to reduce withdrawals and proposed that the JRC should be used effectively to study the technical aspects of water sharing and the effects of the diversions. This, however, did not resolve the underlying dispute. In 1977, the Farakka Agreement was signed for five years, providing a measure of stability through an agreed formula for sharing dry-season flows. Short-term extensions and MoUs followed in 1982 and 1985 before the arrangement lapsed in 1988, ushering in a prolonged period without a formal water-sharing deal.

Against this background, the December 1996 signing of the Ganga Treaty by Prime Ministers HD Deve Gowda and Sheikh Hasina was a significant diplomatic achievement. Interestingly, Sheikh Hasina, while signing the treaty in 1996, carefully referred to it as the Ganga Treaty, rather than the anglicised Ganges, or Padma, the river’s name in Bangladesh.

Yet it drew criticism on both sides. In Bangladesh, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party accused Hasina’s Awami League of kowtowing to India and selling the country’s sovereignty.

In India, several Indian parliamentarians were cautiously optimistic over Gowda’s assertion in the Lok Sabha that the treaty would end “what has been a constant irritant”. But Uma Bharati of the BJP, unamused, retorted that more water was being given to Bangladesh, while Atal Bihari Vajpayee called for a wider discussion. Congress leader PR Dasmunshi hailed the treaty as a milestone but cautioned that West Bengal’s water utilisation was in the “hands of UP and Bihar”. It was a striking observation. India’s bilateral water relations are also influenced by domestic upstream-downstream dynamics. JD(U) leader Sanjay Kumar Jha recently revived Bihar’s concerns that the state’s interests were inadequately addressed in the 1996 treaty.

That legacy of cooperation now faces a new test. Growing disquiet in Bihar over Farakka’s consequences demands fresh examination. Equally important is whether the barrage has delivered the navigational and economic benefits originally envisaged for the Calcutta port. However sensitive the question, it is worth asking whether Farakka has outlived its economic life and functional utility.

The immediate priority must be to prevent December 12 from becoming a cliff edge. India and Bangladesh should consider an interim arrangement that preserves existing operational practices without prejudicing either side’s position on a future treaty. Recently, Bangladesh’s water resources minister, Shahid Uddin Chowdhury Anee, said, “We must conclude a new Ganges Treaty before December 12.” However, while the deadline underscores the urgency of negotiations, it must not come at the expense of detailed technical assessment and mutual understanding.

Reciprocity must be the organising principle of the next agreement. India’s upstream position brings responsibilities, but transparency cannot be a one-sided obligation. India should share timely, reliable upstream-flow data, while Bangladesh should provide corresponding downstream information on the Padma and related hydrological conditions.

The successor arrangement must also address climate resilience. Joint flood forecasting, early-warning systems, drought planning and procedures for extreme events are essential. The treaty’s existing commitment to examine augmentation of dry-season flows offers a starting point for renewed technical work. Both countries should assess feasible options through rigorous hydrological, environmental and economic studies. Upstream storage and wider basin possibilities, including proposals involving the Brahmaputra, require particular caution. They cannot be treated as ready-made solutions without examining engineering feasibility, ecological consequences, costs and the interests of other riparian countries. The rational course is to preserve negotiated sharing while building a framework for shared water security.

Uttam Kumar Sinha is senior fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). The views expressed are personal

 
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